Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing data sets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set. This version of the data extends the temporal domain, corrects errors, updates cases that were ongoing as of the last release, and includes a few additional variables. We describe the dataset, paying special attention to the key differences in the new version, and we present descriptive statistics for some of the key variables, highlighting differences across versions. Since the major change in the data set was to more than double the time period covered, we also present some simple statistics showing trends in sanctions use over time.
Introduction
Research on economic sanctions has progressed significantly over the past two decades. Prior to that time, most studies were of a single case and generally focused on explaining why sanctions had not, and could not, "work" in the particular example under investigation (Galtung, 1967; Hoffman, 1967; Baer, 1973; Schreiber, 1973; Olson, 1979; von Amerongen, 1980; Wallensteen, 1983) . These studies tended to focus on prominent cases that were "prominent" precisely because they had gone on for a long time without success. This obvious selection bias led to the general conclusion that economic sanctions did not work. However, recent studies have developed far more rigorous theories and have tested hypotheses systematically using data sets containing information on hundreds of cases. This work has produced a more nuanced view of sanctions and has shown that they can, sometimes, bring about a change in target state policies and that we can identify the conditions under which this is more or less likely.
The first wave of large-N studies relied quite heavily on data collected by Elliott (1990, 2007) . While significant advances in our understanding of sanctions processes were made by research using these data, 2 theoretical advances led the field to the point at which new data were required. In particular, a number of scholars argued that, since potential targets can adjust their behavior before sanctions are imposed in anticipation of the potential costs, sanctions might be more effective at the threat stage than at the imposition stage (Drezner 2003; Morgan & Miers 1999; Smith 1996) . To test these arguments, a new data set on the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) was 1 We gratefully acknowledge the support received from the National Science Foundation grants ARRA/SES -0921652 and ARRA/SES -0921264. We also acknowledge the numerous individuals who have assisted with the project over the years, including Sezi Anac, Marcos de R. Antuna, Jaewook Chung, Liora Danan, Sara El Hakim, Tobias Heinrich, Nadia Jilani, Danielle Jung, Anna Kuntz, Bo Ram Kwon, Gabriele Magni, Carla Martinez Machain, Michaela Mattes, Alayne Potter, Rosa Sandoval-Bustos, Emily Spears, Fanglu Sun, Rebecca Vigen, Greg Vonnahme, Ahra Wu, Daniel Zaccariello, and, especially, Valentin Krustev. 2 For examples, see Lam 1990; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff, 1997; Morgan and Schwebach, 1997; Bonetti, 1998; & Drezner 1998. released in late 2006. 3 The original TIES data set includes data on 888 cases in which sanctions were threatened and/or imposed in the 1971-2000 period. While these data do enable us to test hypotheses on the effectiveness of threats as well as to revisit earlier findings on the effectiveness of sanctions, 4 there are limitations regarding their usefulness for testing other important hypotheses. The time period covered is too short to test many hypotheses regarding changes in the use of sanctions over time and our ability to use these data to test hypotheses regarding the duration of sanctions is hindered because they do not capture several of the important, long-term sanctions episodes that were initiated prior to 1970 (e.g., the U.S. vs. Cuba, or those against Rhodesia and South Africa).
To redress some of these issues, we have recently updated the TIES data set 5 . The data set has been extended to cover the 1945-2005 period 6 . In addition, we have corrected some errors found in the previous version of the data set, we have updated the information on cases that were ongoing as of the previous release, and we have included a few more variables. Our purpose in this article is to introduce the updated version of TIES. In the next section, we will describe, briefly, the data set and some of the definitions and coding rules that guided the data collection. We will also provide some general, descriptive statistics characterizing the data and emphasize the differences between the versions of TIES. We will follow this with a series of simple analyses that explore the changes, or lack thereof, in sanctions over time. We believe that some of these patterns are surprising and that future research that explores these patterns more fully will advance, significantly, our understanding of sanctions processes.
3 Morgan et al. 2009 . The data for this first round was collected through NSF grant SES-0137792. 4 Bapat & Kwon 2013; Bapat & Morgan 2009; Cranmer et al 2013; Escribà-Folch 2010; Krustev & Morgan 2011; Peterson 2012; Wallace 2013; Whang et al 2013. 5 The data and user's guide are available at http://www.unc.edu/~bapat/TIES.htm. 6 Our initial intent was to extend the data to 2010. We discovered that there are a number of problems associated with gathering data on recent cases. In particular, the information on cases is less complete and less agreed upon. Also, many more recent cases have not yet resolved. This led to the decision to end this version of the data in 2005. 8 Each of these candidate cases was then researched extensively and written case summaries of each that was believed to meet our requirement for inclusion were prepared. Coders then used these written summaries to determine the values of the variables included in the data set, but if it was determined that additional investigation was required, it was conducted. 9 At each stage, care was taken to ensure the reliability of our procedures by having two, or more, people perform the same tasks for a number of cases and checking the degree to which there was agreement.
The Data
A sanctions case begins when the sender(s) makes a threat about the possibility of 7 Much of this section provides definitions of key concepts and discusses coding rules and discussions of variables. Thus, significant passages are taken verbatim from the web-based users' guide and have appeared in grant proposals and the article introducing the initial version of TIES (Morgan et al 2009) . 8 As in the first TIES collection, the keywords used to detect potential cases included sanctions, tariffs, export controls, embargoes, import bans, travel bans, asset freezes, aid cuts, and blockades. 9 Many potential cases were eliminated at each stage on the grounds that they were determined not to meet our criteria for inclusion. In addition, there were many instances in which multiple written summaries were merged into a single case as well as instances in which a single summary served as the basis for several cases.
sanctions or imposes sanctions with no previous threat and makes a demand regarding a desired change in the target state's behavior. Threats and demands may or may not be specific; they need only declare that sanctions are a possibility against the target state and identify the offending behavior. Threats may be initiated in several ways, such as through verbal statements by government officials, drafting of legislation against a target state, or the passage of a conditional law against a target state stipulating that sanctions will be imposed if certain target behaviors are not changed.
In several instances, sanctions are imposed as a result of legislation designed to monitor the behavior of potential target states. Examples include yearly determinations of whether a country is engaged in nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, or the sponsorship of terrorism. The sender conducts routine investigations of the behaviors of potential targets on an annual basis. If this is the case, the initial passage of legislation is considered to be the start of a case for countries that are violating the conditions of the law needed to avoid sanctions. Alternatively, in situations in which countries that are in compliance in the period in which the law is passed but later violate the laws, the case is considered to have begun after the potential target chooses to violate the sender's law 10 . This allows a case to begin with actions taken by the target state.
A case is considered to start on the day when the sender makes a threat or implements sanctions, or when then target engages in behavior that makes it noncompliant with the sender's laws as noted above. A case is considered to end on the day when either, a) the target alters its behavior to the satisfaction of the sender, b) the sender removes sanctions imposed on the target, c) or the sender makes a clear decision to not carry out a threat even in the absence of changes in target behavior. In many of these cases, senders identify an offensive behavior and make a threat to impose sanctions, but choose not to follow through on these threats. We consider these cases to end if we were unable to find any mention of sanctions for one year after the last documented news story pertaining to the imposed, we identify the type of sanctions levied, the estimated costs to both target and sender, and who within the sender state is responsible for implementation. We also identify if any carrots were promised, or provided, during the case and whether diplomatic sanctions (e.g., recall of an ambassador) were used. The outcome of a case is characterized by whether the target partially or completely acquiesced to the sender's demands at the threat stage or after sanctions were imposed, whether a negotiated settlement was reached at the threat stage or after sanctions were imposed, whether the sender capitulated at the threat stage or after sanctions, or whether the case resulted in a stalemate.
There are a few significant differences between this version of the data set and the previous version. First, in the previous version, we provided a start date for the case; but, if a case began with a threat and sanctions were imposed, we did not provide a date for the imposition of sanctions. We now include a variable identifying the onset of sanctions imposition in the relevant cases. Second, for those cases with missing end dates, we now include a variable that specifies the last date for which we have some record indicating the case was still ongoing. 11 Third, we have changed the way in which we treat a number of variables that could assume more than one value for the same case. For example, several actors (e.g., the President, the Secretary of State, the Majority leader in the Senate) could make threats, demands could be made on several issues, several different types of sanctions could be imposed, and so forth. In the previous version coders were restricted in the number of values they could include. For example, in the variable 'Threat Identity' only the most senior official was coded. In this version of the data, coders were able to list all possible values for these variables. Finally, when international organizations are involved, we now allow coders to specify which organization through the Correlates of War institutional ID codes (Pevehouse et al 2004) . 12 Fourth, we now include two dichotomous variables (Threat and Imposition) to identify if the case includes a threat and whether or not sanctions were imposed.
Other changes in the data set involve specific aspects of the data. First, in the previous version of the data set, we included cases involving Hong Kong and Macau, although neither met our criteria for inclusion-i.e., being considered a member of the international system by the Correlates of War project. We have removed those cases in this version of the data. We have retained cases involving the EU as a target or sender, and given it the country code '1000.' In a number of cases, the EU appears very much like a single sender or target, in the sense that it adopts a common policy. We felt it makes sense to treat it as a single actor in those cases. There are cases, however, in which a EU member acts on its own as either a sender or as a target; and, in some of these cases, the EU behaves 11 Previously, we treated the end date for cases where no information as 'missing.' Typically, these cases tended to be low profile, economic disputes. Treating these cases as 'missing' may lead to the impression that these types of disputes last longer than others. We therefore included the new variable identifying our last known record of the case. 12 We did this only for the seventeen institutions that are most frequently involved in sanctions. If another institution was involved in a particular case, coders could code the institution ID as 'other' and write in the identity of the institution. The institution IDs can be obtained from the Correlates of War Inter-Governmental Organization codebook, which is available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/IGOs/IGO_codebook_v2.1.pdf very much like an international institution. For these cases, we code the institutional involvement of the EU, using the COW institution code as described in the previous paragraph. Second, we have changed the coding procedures for the variables capturing whether senders also used diplomatic sanctions or offered carrots to the target. If we found evidence of diplomatic sanctions or carrots, we coded the variable as '1.' Otherwise, we coded the variable as 'missing.' Partly, this was done to ensure consistency across coders.
More importantly, we believe it more accurately reflects the information available. Finding no evidence of diplomatic sanctions or carrots is not the same as finding evidence that they were not used. Finally, since we were not looking for these things in instances where sanctions were not imposed, we want to avoid any suggestion that users could employ these data to test hypotheses relating to the general use of diplomatic sanctions or carrots outside the context of sanctions use.
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Describing the data
As noted above, there are 1,412 cases in the new version of the data set, compared to 888 in the former version of TIES, indicating a 59% increase in the number of cases.
Further, the new data now cover 61 years worth of information as opposed to the original 30. Sanctions were imposed in 845 of these cases (60%) leaving 567 cases that involved only threats (40%). This compares to 527 cases of imposed sanctions in the previous version of the data. As in the previous version, we include cases in which sanctions were used in trade disputes as well as cases involving security and humanitarian issues. 740 of our cases involve non-trade issues (52%) and 672 are trade-only disputes (48%). We recognize that many scholars believe that trade sanctions are fundamentally different than sanctions imposed for other issues and that they should not be analyzed together. We have opted for inclusivity with the knowledge that any user can easily exclude trade cases. The mean duration of cases for which we have end dates is 2.43 years, which compares to 2.7 years in the previous version of the data. This, of course, underestimates the average duration because it does not 13 In the previous version of TIES, 4% of diplomatic sanctions are identified as 'missing' (42) and 93.6% are coded as 'no diplomatic sanctions' (831). In the new version, we simply state that we found no evidence of diplomatic sanctions in 96.4% of the cases (1,025). The figures are comparable across the two versions. Similarly, the previous version of TIES coded carrots as 'missing' in 28.8% of the cases (256) and 'none' in 69% (613). In the new version, carrots are coded as missing in 96.9% of the cases (952), which is again comparable to the previous version.
consider ongoing cases, some of which are very long lasting.
As in the early version of the data set, the United States is the primary sender in a sizeable portion of cases. The U.S. is the primary sender in a bit over 48% of the cases in the current version versus 46% in the previous data set. The next most frequent primary sender of sanctions is Canada with 112 cases (7.9%), followed by Russia and the United Kingdom with 38 each (2.7%), and India with 34 (2.4%). These top five senders account for about 63.7% of the cases in the dataset. Interestingly, the U.S. is also the most frequent target of sanctions with 103 cases (7.3%) 14 , followed by Japan (5.7%), South Korea (4.1%), China (3.2%), and the European Union (3.1%).
As before, TIES provides multiple ways of identifying whether sanctions were successful at bringing about a change in target state policies. One variable characterizes the final outcome (and whether it occurred at the threat stage or at the imposition of sanctions stage). We have data on this variable for 1,024 cases, the remaining 388 cases are either ongoing or we were unable to determine the outcome. In initially examining the success rate of sanctions, we first treat these cases as unsuccessful (since they have yet to produce gains for the sender) and then as missing. We further use three different definitions of sanctions success. First, we employ a restrictive definition that considers only instances where the target partially or fully acquiesces as successful cases. Second, we use a more relaxed definition that also considers negotiated settlements as successful outcomes. The third measure of success examines the settlement nature variables for the sender and the target.
This variable provides, on a scale of 1-10, the coder's perception of the proportion of the sender's goals that were met in the case and another variable that provides the coder's perception of the proportion of the target's goals that were met. Cases can be considered as "successful" if the value of the variable for the sender is greater than the value of the variable for the target.
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Other Patterns in the New Dataset
Numerous scholars argued that the popularity of sanctions as foreign policy tools is From these data, we should expect that sanctions will either continue to be used at rates seen in the 1990s, or may subsequently decline. This pattern somewhat contradicts the belief that 15 We caution against using either of these variables singly. The intercoder reliability on each is actually fairly low; that is, one coder might see a particular case as an '8' for the sender and a '6' for the target while another coder would see the same case as a '4' for the sender and a '3' for the target. Thus, for either variable, the numbers are not comparable across cases. When we take the two variables together and determine which is the higher, however, intercoder reliability was very high. The coders appeared to be generally in agreement regarding which side faired 'better' even if they could not quite agree on where to place each on a 1-10 scale. 16 Given this very high success rate, we checked to see if the majority of successes were occurring at the threat stage. Of the 576 cases of success, 262 occurred in the threat stage prior to imposition (45%) and 314 (55%) occurred following imposition.
sanctions usage is increasing at an exponential rate, though it is clear that states are using sanctions more frequently in more contemporary periods.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The new data further allow us to observe several trends in the use of sanctions during the postwar period. The mean duration of a sanctions case in the cases where we can identify end dates is 885.4 days, or 2.43 years. These results are consistent with the first version of TIES in its conclusion that sanctions do not tend to last for very long. In the full sample, 49.4% of the sanctions cases end within one year, whereas 75% of the cases end [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . This is consistent with previous empirical research suggesting that multilateral sanctions are more likely to be effective than unilateral sanctions (Bapat & Morgan 2009 ). We see that this pattern is consistent in the expanded dataset. Table 1 demonstrates that in the postwar period, using the restrictive definition of success, 51% of multilateral sanctions produce success as opposed to only 31% of unilateral sanctions efforts (+65%). We therefore see some suggestive evidence that the use of multilateral and institutional sanctions increased following the end of the Cold War, and that these types of sanctions are more likely to be effective. This might suggest that the effectiveness of sanctions depends on the extent of great power cooperation.
Insert Figure 5 about here
Insert Figure 6 about here
Insert Table 2 about here An additional pattern of note in the new data is the prevalence of targeted or "smart" sanctions.
20 A common argument is that smart sanctions appear to be a relatively new phenomenon that is increasingly used by policymakers when imposing sanctions.
Interestingly enough, we see with the greater data collection that targeted sanctions were often used immediately following the end of World War II. The use of targeted sanctions dropped in 1970 and remained low throughout that decade before subsequently increasing in the 1980s and the 1990s. This indicates that if we were to only look at the previous version of TIES, we would conclude that targeted sanctions were indeed a newer phenomenon.
However, with the updated data, we see that this finding is largely an artifact of the temporal restrictions of the first TIES. The expanded data collection indicates that targeted sanctions accounted for 60% of sanctions between [1945] [1946] [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] . By the 1990s, targeted sanctions accounted for 80% of all sanctions, though this percentage fell in the 2000s down to 51%.
Taken together, we see that targeted or smart sanctions are actually not a new tool at all, though the raw number of targeted sanctions is increasing as a function of the increasing use of sanctions in the system.
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We empirically define as sanction as 'smart' if the sanction was intended to target the regime leadership, business interests, or the military using the 'Threatened Target Interest' Variable.
Insert Figure 7 about here
Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to introduce the updated TIES dataset. One of the significant weaknesses of the previous version of TIES was that its temporal domain was shorter than other sanctions datasets, including the HSE data. This clearly created a problem for scholars seeking to analyze sanctions as a process, particularly those seeking to conduct duration analyses that required much more data. We believe that the recent update addresses this concern by including over a half century of coverage from . The recent version allows us to include numerous prominent cases in our analysis, identify the endings of several key cases, and develop a better understanding of trends in how sanctions are used as an instrument of foreign policy. Additionally, the larger amount of data will now make it possible for scholars to test complex hypotheses, particularly those that involve interactions among explanatory variables. We believe that TIES now presents sufficient data to test these more complex hypotheses, as well as those hypotheses seeking to analyze trends in sanctions over time. The first TIES dataset enabled scholars to understand the impact of threats prior to imposition. We believe that this version will provide scholars with the tools to examine 
